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Abstract 
Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but 
recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments 
examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behavior. In Experiment 1, we 
challenged participants’ beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected 
subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited 
using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants’ belief in true and 
false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found 
that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were 
solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used 
except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the 
feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in 
lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an 
important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed 
problem-solving.  
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Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving 
behavior 
 
Jack has a memory in which he put his hand in a cage at the Philadelphia Zoo and his left 
wrist was bitten by a monkey. Years later, his mother assured him that it never happened. He 
does not believe the horrible event actually happened, but he cannot stop having vivid 
‘recollections’ or ‘memories’ concerning the event (http://www.falsememoryarchive.com/). 
The question is, when Jack comes across monkeys in the zoo, will he stay away from them?  
Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events has been 
undermined but the recollection has been preserved, are called nonbelieved memories 
(NBMs). This recently studied phenomenon turns out not to be rare, with more than 20% of 
people reporting that they have vivid but non-believed autobiographical memories (Mazzoni, 
Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010). A lingering question is whether these NBMs have any impact on 
behavior (e.g., avoiding monkeys). The current experiments delve into this question by 
examining the (in)dependent behavioral consequences of beliefs and recollections on 
performance on subsequent problem-solving tasks.  
Previous research on the behavioral consequences of memories has predominantly 
focused on believed memories (Scoboria, Jackson, Talarico, Hanczakowski, Wysman, & 
Mazzoni, 2014), with few studies looking at the behavioral consequences of nonbelieved 
memories. An important reason why we focus on the behavioral consequences of NBMs is 
that there is a new line of research that has demonstrated that belief and recollection are 
independent constructs that can have differential effects on behavior (Scoboria, Mazzoni, 
Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004; Scoboria, Talarico, & Pascal, 2015). Here, belief refers to the truth-
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value related to the occurrence of an event, whether or not a recollection is present. 
Recollection refers to the mental re-experiencing of an event (e.g., Rubin, 2006). Various 
theorists argue that memories contain key components that lead to both a sense of re-
experiencing the event and a belief that the event actually occurred (e.g. James, 1890/1950; 
Brewer, 1996; Schacter, 1996; Tulving, 1985).  
In recent years, this view has gained more attention, with the distinction between belief 
and recollection being supported by empirical research. For example, Scoboria et al. (2014) 
used structural equation modelling and found that factors that predicted recollection (e.g., 
perception, re-experiencing) were distinct from factors that predicted belief (e.g., plausibility), 
suggesting a dissociation between recollection and belief. For most of our memories, belief 
and recollection both contribute to remembering. Scoboria and Talarico (2013) found that for 
believed autobiographical memories, belief and recollection ratings both tend to be at the high 
end (above 7) on a 1 to 8 likert scale.  
However, in other cases, only belief or recollection is present. For example, there are 
family stories (e.g., your birth) that one believes occurred but cannot recollect. There are also 
NBMs where vivid recollections of events exist (e.g., believing you actually saw Santa Claus 
putting presents under the tree as a child) but beliefs for these events are undermined (e.g., by 
acquiring knowledge that Santa Claus is a fictional character) (Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 
2010; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014).  
An examination of NBMs may help uncover how belief and recollection interactively 
lead to behavioral outcomes. For instance, in studies investigating how believed memories 
impact behavior, participants exhibited superior public speaking performance and higher 
levels of exercise if believed memories of relevant positive experiences were activated (see 
Biondolillo & Pillemer, 2015; Pezdek & Salim, 2011). However, because these ‘memories’ 
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were both believed and recollected, it is hard to know whether it was recollection, belief, or 
both that were responsible for the changes in subsequent behavior.  
Research concerning false memories has also examined the impact of belief on behavior. 
For example, Bernstein and Loftus (2009) reviewed a number of studies where researchers 
created false memories about childhood events, such as being ill after eating egg-salad. These 
memories resulted in a subsequent reduction in eating egg-salad. Again, however, it is hard to 
determine the source of change in subsequent behavior as belief and recollection were 
confounded. That is, participants developed a false belief about the false memory (event) with 
approximately a quarter of participants reporting having recollections of the false event (also 
see, Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry, & Bernstein, 2012). Indeed, these authors were acutely aware 
of this problem as Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, and Loftus (2008, p. 291) noted that, 
“the data in the present paper represent some false memories and some false beliefs. But 
because it is awkward to say ‘false memories and false beliefs’ repeatedly, we generally just 
use one term (either “false memory” or “false belief”) to encompass the notion of planting a 
false entity.”  
To our knowledge, there is no research that has directly and experimentally tested 
whether it is false belief or false recollection that affects behavior (but see Otgaar, 
Moldoveanu, Wang, & Howe, 2016). Recently, Bernstein, Scoboria, and Arnold (2015) 
conducted a mega-analysis on previously published food-preference experiments (see above) 
and concluded that for false events, belief is more important than memory in modifying food 
preference. Indeed, they stated that, “[c]ompared to memory of past events, belief in the 
occurrence of past events is more important for altering attitudes and behaviors” (p. 6). 
However, in all the experiments reviewed, belief and recollection for the suggested false 
events were neither intentionally nor clearly manipulated separately. Moreover, NBMs were 
not addressed in any of the experiments. Perhaps more importantly, food preferences may 
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result in part from decision-making processes that are analytic and occur consciously. For 
instance, participants might reason: “Since egg-salad made me ill, I’d better not eat it.” 
However, in a problem-solving process that involves intuitive thinking or ‘Aha!’ experiences 
(e.g., insight-based problem-solving; Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Howe, 
Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010), there is usually no explicit reasoning about facts/knowledge. 
Recollection might play a vital role independent of belief in insight-based problem-solving 
behavior where people are unaware of the processes underlying the solutions to these types of 
problems. 
The Current Experiments 
        The main purpose of the current experiments is to examine the impact of nonbelieved 
memories on insight-based problem-solving behavior. We decided not to use the food 
preference paradigm to elicit false beliefs/memories because this paradigm only allows one 
false belief or false memory to be created per participant. Because so few false beliefs and 
memories are created, it is even more difficult to produce the necessary number of 
nonbelieved memories. Therefore, we opted for a method that leads to high and reliable levels 
of false memories, the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995). In this paradigm, participants are presented with lists of associated 
words (e.g., butter, food, eat, sandwich) that are all related to a non-presented critical lure (i.e., 
bread). Participants not only correctly remember (recall, recognize) items presented on the 
lists but also form false memories for critical lures that were not presented. In the present 
experiments, after false memories were formed with the DRM paradigm, participants were 
challenged on their responses by telling them certain items were not presented in an attempt to 
create nonbelieved false memories. Data from our lab (Otgaar et al., 2016) have confirmed 
that nonbelieved false memories can be created using the DRM paradigm. Also by using this 
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paradigm we were able to examine the impact of beliefs on true memory and explore the 
effects of nonbelieved true memories on behavior.  
Following the challenges to true and false memories, participants were asked to solve 
compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, in which solutions referred to 
nonbelieved and believed words (true and false memories from DRM lists). A CRAT problem 
consists of three words (e.g., Board/Mail/Magic). To solve the problem, participants have to 
come up with a word that could link all the three words (in the example given above, the 
answer was Black). Howe et al., (2010) presented participants with DRM lists and then asked 
participants to solve CRAT problems whose solutions were critical lures for the DRM lists. 
They found that CRAT problems primed by false memories for critical lures were solved 
more frequently and significantly faster than problems that were not primed. Subsequent 
research typically showed the priming effect of believed false memories on CRAT problems 
(Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Howe, Wilkinson, Garner, & Ball, 2015); and 
found that the priming effect of false memories was similar to or even stronger than that 
observed for true memories (Howe, Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013; Howe, 
Wilkinson, Monaghan, Ball, & Garner, 2013). Based on Bernstein et al.’s work (2015), we 
predicted that if belief is more influential than recollection when it comes to impacting 
subsequent behaviors that ostensibly require non-conscious problem-solving processes, no 
priming effect would be found after beliefs for false memories are withdrawn. However, if 
recollection plays a more vital role in priming the CRATs than beliefs, then nonbelieved false 
memories should prime as many CRATs as believed false memories.  
We were also interested in exploring individual differences in the formation of NBMs. 
Social feedback has been found to be one of the main contributors to fostering NBMs 
(Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, 2015) and hence we included the Gudjonsson Compliance 
Scale (Gudjonsson, 1989) in order to examine individual differences in social compliance. 
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Furthermore, a scale measuring dissociative symptoms was administered because dissociation 
has frequently been linked to the formation of false memories (Giesbrecht, Lynn, Lilienfeld, 
& Merckelbach, 2008).  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Before the recruitment of participants, we ran a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with an estimated power of 0.80 and a medium effect size 
of 0.25 (f). The power analysis revealed that 34 participants needed to be tested. A total of 36 
students from Maastricht University participated in the experiment in exchange for credit 
points or a financial reward of €7.50. Two participants were excluded because they did not 
complete the CRAT problem-solving session, thus leaving 34 participants (14 males and 20 
females). All participants were native English speakers, aged between 17 and 34 (Mage = 21.6, 
SD = 3.26). The experiment was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
Materials 
DRM lists. Sixteen DRM lists were used in our experiment. These lists have 
successfully been used in previous research (e.g., Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013). Each DRM 
list included 12 associated words (e.g., butter, food, eat, sandwich) and these words are all 
related to a non-presented target or “critical lure” (i.e., bread). Importantly, to eliminate 
possible item effects arising from differences between a studied item and a critical lure, for 
eight lists the first list word was replaced by the critical lure (see also Howe et al., 2013). 
Thus, these “critical lures” are no longer “false” memories as they now become “true” studied 
items presented as part of the list. The other eight lists were standard DRM lists that had the 
corresponding eight critical lures. The recognition task contained 56 words, of which 24 items 
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were presented items from the DRM lists, 8 were non-presented critical lures from the DRM 
lists, and 24 words were not presented and served as unrelated lures.  
CRAT problems. We used 24 CRAT problems in this experiment (taken from Howe et 
al., 2013). Each CRAT was comprised of three words (e.g., crust, stale, French), all of which 
could be solved by a single linking word (i.e., bread). Sixteen CRATs were primed by the 
preceding sixteen DRM lists: half of the CRAT problems were primed by lists whose false 
memories (critical lures) were the solution words and the other half were primed by lists 
whose true memories (studied items) were the solution words (see Appendix). The other eight 
CRATs were not primed and served as an unprimed control condition. The mean solution rate 
and solution time for each CRAT were known from previous research (Howe et al., 2013). 
Figure 1 illustrates the alignment of DRM items and CRAT problems. 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989). The GCS is a self-report 
questionnaire measuring the degree of compliance. It contains 20 true/false statements (e.g., 
“I often give in to people when I am under pressure”). The total score of GCS ranges from 0 
to 20, with higher scores indicating more compliant tendencies. The CGS has an internal 
consistency of .71 and a test-retest reliability coefficient of .88. 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putman, 1986). The DES measures 
the degree to which people experience dissociative symptoms. It consists of 28 items (e.g., 
“Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they suddenly 
realize that they did not hear part of all of what was said.”) and participants have to select 
what percentage of time this happens to them from 0% to 100% with 10% increments. It has a 
good internal consistency, with Cronbach α= .92. 
  Design and Procedure  
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 A 3(Memory Type: critical lures, studied items, unrelated items) × 2 (Belief: challenged 
vs. control) within-subject design was used. Participants were tested individually for 
approximately 50 minutes in lab facilities at the faculty. There were four phases.  
1) Study phase: DRM words were presented to participants on a computer screen. 
Participants were instructed to remember as many words as they could. Each word was 
visually presented for 1500ms, with 500ms inter-stimulus interval using the program Visual 
Basic. The sequence of the words within a list was fixed, but the order of the lists was 
randomized.   
 2) Recognition phase: After a distractor task (playing the game Bejeweled for 3 min), 
participants were involved in a recognition task, in which 8 critical lures, 24 studied words, 
and 24 unrelated words were included to examine false memories and true memories, 
respectively. Participants were asked to identify the word on the screen as to whether it had 
been presented by clicking on a “Yes” or “No” button.  Next, participants completed the 
dissociation questionnaire (DES) before they moved to the challenging phase (see below). 
3) Challenging phase: Participants were told that the computer graded their answers and 
gave them feedback on their performance on the previous recognition test. Before their 
responses were challenged, participants were told why our memories were  sometimes 
unreliable and they were shown an extra DRM list to illustrate how a DRM list could lead to 
the formation of false memories. This explanation was given so participants understood why 
feedback was presented.  
In the challenged belief condition, when a certain target word (e.g., bread) appeared on 
the screen, a label beneath the word popped up stating that “Sorry, your previous answer was 
incorrect. This word was not presented.”  In the control condition, the feedback was 
“Congratulations, your answer was correct. This word was presented.” In this way, we 
attempted to create nonbelieved and believed memories, respectively. When the feedback was 
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provided, the experimenter showed participants a printed fake proof where presented words 
were listed and gave oral social feedback asking them to rethink their previous answer. Then 
immediately after the challenge for each word, participants rated their memory and belief for 
that word on 1-8 Likert scales (i.e., “Do you have a memory for this word?”, 1= no memory at 
all, 8 = clear and complete memory; “Do you believe that this word was presented to you?”, 
1= definitely did not happen, 8 = definitely did happen; adapted from Scoboria et al., 2004). 
The experimenter explained thoroughly to the participant the difference between memory (i.e., 
recollection) and belief. The sequence of all challenged words was randomized. In total, 56 
words from the recognition test were given feedback, but we were only interested in the 24 
target words that served as solutions to the corresponding CRAT problems. The belief in half 
of the target words (4 critical lures, 4 studied words, and 4 unrelated) was always challenged 
regardless of their original recognition responses. The other words were in the control 
condition in which participants’ belief in their presence was not challenged.  
    4) Problem-solving phase: Twenty-four CRAT problems were presented in which the 
correct answers were the target words in the challenging phase. The twenty-four CRATs were 
assigned to six (3×2) conditions. An ANOVA revealed no statistically significant differences 
between mean solution rates across different item types (F(2, 18) = 0.01; p = 0.99) and 
different belief conditions (F(1, 18) = 0.001; p = 0.97). There were no solution time 
differences across item types (F(2, 18) = 0.02; p = 0.98) and belief conditions (F(1, 18) = 0.16; 
p = 0.70). These analyses were done as a manipulation check to make sure there was no 
baseline difference in reaction times and solution rates among clusters of CRATs across 
conditions. 
      Participants were falsely told that the problem-solving phase was a separate experiment 
aimed at examining how personality (i.e., the dissociation questionnaire) affected problem-
solving style. Participants were instructed that three words would be presented on the screen 
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and their task was to come up with a word that could link all the three words. Participants 
were given an example first  (e.g., the answer to the problem apple/family/house was tree), 
followed by one practice CRAT problem that they had completed themselves before they 
began the test CRATs. Problems were presented in a random order. A countdown timer 
appeared in the upper right corner of the screen and participants were asked to type their 
solution within 60 seconds. Upon completion of each CRAT, no correct answer was given to 
lower the risk that participants would connect the memory task with the problem-solving task. 
Solution rates and times were recorded by the computer. After all sessions, participants filled 
in the compliance scale (GCS) and were debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
Results and Discussion 
Recognition rates 
The mean recognition rate for all studied items was 74.50% (N = 608). The mean false 
recognition rate for critical lures was 69.13% (N = 188), which is consistent with previous 
research (e.g., Blair, Lenton, & Hastie, 2002). Participants falsely recognized 14.63% (N = 20) 
of non-presented unrelated items. 
The mean recognition rate in each condition is shown in Table 1. Recognition rates were 
analyzed using a 3(Memory Type: critical lures, studied items, unrelated items) × 2(Belief: 
challenged vs. control) repeated measures ANOVA.  No interaction was found, F(2, 66) = 
1.57, p = .22, partial η2 = .05. There was a main effect of Memory Type, F(2, 66) = 185.51, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .85, where Bonferroni post-hoc analyses showed that participants 
recognized statistically more critical lures and studied words than non-presented words (ps 
< .001). There was no main effect of Belief, F(1, 33) = 0.91, p = .35, partial η2 = .03, 
indicating that there were an equivalent number of true and false memories in both the 
challenged belief and control conditions.   
  Nonbelieved and believed memories 
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We recorded memory and belief ratings for each word after the challenge manipulation. 
Analogous to previous research, we employed the following criteria for nonbelieved 
memories: recollection needed to be rated at least 2 scale points higher than belief (see 
Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, 2014; Otgaar, Moldoveanu, Wang, & Howe, 2016), and within this 
criterion, the recollection rating should be at least 3. For believed memories, we set the same 
criterion for recollection rating (at least 3) as in nonbelieved memories, and belief rating 
should be equal to, or above, 3. Within the categories of nonbelieved and believed memories, 
if the item was a critical lure, it was a false memory; if it was a studied item, it was a true 
memory. For unrelated items, there were two categories: items with no belief and no memory 
(ratings ≤ 2) and items with no memory but belief. Table 2 shows the mean Memory and 
Belief ratings for words in each condition.  
After the challenge manipulation, 97.1% of the participants (n = 33) had formed at least 
one nonbelieved true memory for studied items, with an average number of 3.15 (SD = 1.05) 
nonbelieved memories. 79.4% of the participants (n= 27) had developed at least one 
nonbelieved false memory, with an average number of 2.24 (SD = 1.52). In the challenged 
belief condition, participants formed nonbelieved false memories for 55.88% of the critical 
lures and formed nonbelieved true memories for 78.68% of the studied words. In the control 
condition, participants formed believed false memories for 91.18% of the critical items and 
formed believed true memories for 89.71% of the studied words. 
Solution rates of CRATs 
The mean CRAT solution rates (in proportions) were calculated for each participant. We 
focused on words that were effectively manipulated into believed/nonbelieved memories. We 
labelled the effect of successfully challenging or lowering participants’ beliefs as 
“undermining.” Seven participants had formed either zero nonbelieved false memories or zero 
nonbelieved true memories, hence the CRAT solution rates of these cases were treated as 
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missing values. However, these participants had CRAT solution values in the believed 
memory conditions, thus we used a multiple imputation method (Schafer, 1997) to impute 
missing data values. In total, 3.9% of the data (8 out of 204 cells) were imputed over five 
cycles of imputations. We compared the CRAT solution rates in the undermining belief 
condition with the CRAT solution rate in the control condition for the following three 
memory types: critical lures, studied items, and unrelated items
1
. Interestingly, undermining 
belief led to different results for false and true memories. In the critical lures condition, 
undermining belief (M = 0.36, SD = 0.29) led to statistically lower solution rates than control 
(M = 0.49, SD = 0.28), t = -2.04, dfpooled = 884, p = .04. However, for studied items, 
undermining belief increased solution rates significantly (undermining belief, M = 0.52, SD = 
0.27; control condition, M = 0.40, SD = 0.25, t = 2.04, dfpooled = 3353, p =.04; see Figure 2). 
We compared the CRAT solution rates in the control condition to see whether the results in 
the control condition were consistent with previous research. Paired samples t-tests showed 
that false memories did not differ significantly from true memories in priming the CRATs (p 
=.27); false and true memories both primed more CRATs than unrelated items (p = .008; p 
= .02). Thus, the results in the control condition replicate previous findings on the 
consequences of false memories on problem-solving (e.g., Howe et al., 2013). 
As has been done in previous related work (e.g., Otgaar, Howe, van Beers, van Hoof, 
Bronzwaer, & Smeets, 2015), we also performed an additional analysis by focusing only on 
the items that participants recognized as “presented” in the recognition test. When words with 
“yes (presented)” recognition responses only were included in analysis, a similar interaction 
effect between memory and belief was found, F(2, 64) = 5.36, p < .01, partial η2 = .14. No 
main effect of belief was found, F(1, 32) = 0.35, p = .56. No main effect of memory was 
                                        
1
 In this analysis, words were evaluated as nonbelieved memories when memory ratings for them were two 
points higher than belief ratings. When we adopted a stricter criterion (i.e., memory ratings are at least three 
points higher than belief ratings), we found a same interactive pattern and the true memory effect was less 
pronounced (see supplementary document).  
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found, F(2, 64) = 2.37, p = .10.  
Solution times of CRATs  
  Mean solution times of CRATs (in seconds) in each condition were calculated. We were 
particularly interested in comparing the solution times between nonbelieved and believed 
memories. In some cases, participants solved no CRATs under the priming of (non)believed 
memories, thus solution times in that condition were counted as missing. In total, there were 
19.11% (N = 39) of the cases where solution times were missing. We conducted several 
paired sample t-tests and again found decreasing belief had different effects for false and true 
memories. In the critical lures condition, nonbelieved false memory (M = 17.75, SD = 9.07) 
primed problems as fast as believed false memory (M = 14.47, SD = 7.16; p = .27); however, 
in the studied items condition, undermining belief (M = 12.80, SD = 5.18) resulted in faster 
solution times to CRAT problems than in the control condition (M = 20.33, SD = 10.30; p 
= .003). Undermining belief (M = 15.33, SD = 9.58) and control conditions (M = 18.28, SD = 
12.15) did not differ in solution times for unrelated items (p = .77). 
2
 
Exploratory Analysis 
      We conducted Pearson’s correlations between the scores on the GCS and the different 
memories (believed true/false memory; nonbelieved true/false memory). We found a 
statistically significant correlation between GCS scores and false recognition rates (r (32) 
= .38, p = .03): the higher scores on the GCS, the higher false recognition rates. No 
correlation between GCS scores and true recognition rates was detected. As GCS scores 
measure compliance, we expected that the more compliance participants exhibited, the more 
nonbelieved memories they would report. However, no statistically significant correlation was 
found between GCS scores and number of nonbelieved false memories (r (32) = .31, p = .07).  
        Correlations between DES scores and different kinds of memories were also analyzed. 
                                        
2 The pattern of results was basically similar when a three-point criterion (i.e. memory recollection was 
rated at least 3 points higher than belief) for nonbelieved memories was adopted. 
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We found a statistically significant negative correlation between dissociative symptoms and 
true recognition rates (r (32) = -.44, p = .01). Thus, participants scoring high on dissociation 
had worse memories for presented words. No correlation was found between DES scores and 
false recognition rates. Interestingly, dissociation scores correlated negatively with the 
number of nonbelieved unrelated items (r (32) = -.36, p = .04) but not nonbelieved true 
memories (r (32) = -.08, p = .64) or nonbelieved false memories (r (32) = -.01, p = .94). Of 
course, we had a small sample size for executing correlation analyses, so the results of these 
analyses should be cautiously treated. 
Experiment 1 examined the behavioral consequences of belief and recollection. We 
found that in the control condition, false memories primed the CRATs as efficiently as true 
memories, a finding consistent with previous research (Howe et al., 2010). Interestingly and 
for the first time, our data also showed that, without belief, the priming effect of false 
memories was changed under the conditions tested. This is in line with research by Bernstein 
and colleagues (2015). That is, when belief in false memories was withdrawn, participants 
solved fewer CRAT problems. This result constitutes the first experimental attempt that 
shows that nonbelieved (false) memories impact problem-solving behavior and do so 
differently than true memories.  
Some might argue that believed false memories primed more CRATs than nonbelieved 
false memories because a higher number of believed false memories were created. However, 
our data on the other memory types did not support this idea. In the studied item condition, 
there were more believed true memories induced, but believed true memories did not prime 
more CRAT problems than nonbelieved true memories. Others might argue that memory for 
an event is different from memory for a word and the implication of studying NBMs for 
words might not be so illuminating. Indeed, an event consists of multiple elements and 
usually a recollection of an event contains more vivid details than a recollection of a word. 
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Hence, nonbelieved memories for events might exhibit greater behavioral impact than 
nonbelieved memories for words.  
Although our data suggest that for false memory, belief might play an active role in 
problem solving, our study is still preliminary and needs replication. Furthermore, the results 
of this experiment were somewhat limited because of the following. First, in this experiment, 
there were only four CRATs in each condition. When we attempted to induce nonbelieved 
memories for the four solution words to these CRATs, not all of the items could be 
successfully transformed into nonbelieved memories. The average nonbelieved memory rate 
of critical lures and studied items was in the 55%-80% range. If there are more items in each 
condition, more NBMs can be created and thus, the effects of beliefs and recollections can be 
better investigated. Second, the CRAT problems in each condition were fixed; that is, they not 
completely randomized for every participant. Although the mean solution rates and times for 
CRATs were counterbalanced across conditions, it is unknown whether the difficulty of 
CRATs impacted our results. In order to address these issues and thus, replicate our results, 
we conducted an additional experiment.  
In Experiment 2, we assigned more CRAT problems to each condition and CRAT 
problems were no longer fixed in each condition. Furthermore, having established the 
immediate effect of undermining belief on problem solving, Experiment 2 explored the long-
lasting effects of nonbelieved memories on problem-solving behavior. From a theoretical 
perspective, this is important because previous studies have found that the superior priming 
effect of false memories emerged particularly after a 1-week delay while the priming effect of 
true memories declined (Howe et al., 2013). One possible explanation is that true memories 
decay faster than false memories because true memories are often other-generated (e.g., 
presented on a list by the experimenter), whereas false memories tend to be self-
generated [i.e., occurring spontaneously and automatically as a result of internal semantic 
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activation (Howe, Garner, Threadgold, & Ball, 2015)]. This pattern corresponds to findings 
from previous studies on false memories and food preferences in which the behavioral impact 
of belief could last for months (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). Furthermore, previous research 
has shown that false beliefs can last up to four months (see Geraerts, Bernstein, Merckelbach, 
Linders, Raymaekers, & Loftus, 2008; Laney, Fowler, Nelson, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2008) 
and experimentally evoked nonbelieved false memories endure for as long as a month (Otgaar, 
Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013). 
Because the behavioral effects of false beliefs may be long-lasting and because belief is 
more easily manipulated than memory, one could anticipate the following. If belief is the 
more active agent in guiding behavior than memory, then undermining belief should lead to 
behavioral effects even after a delay. As belief is assumed to be part of knowledge related to 
the self (e.g., Scoboria et al., 2004), the enduring behavioral effects of belief would be 
especially evident for false memories as they are the result of internal associative activation 
and thus, self-generated.  Hence, in Experiment 2, half of the participants had to complete the 
CRAT problem-solving task immediately and the other half following a one-week delay.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
A power analysis indicated 70 participants were needed when a power of 0.80 and a 
medium effect size of 0.27 (f) were estimated. A total of 71 participants were tested in 
exchange for credit points or a financial reward of €7.50. The sample consisted of 22 males 
and 49 females, with a mean age of 22.3 years old (SD = 5.97). 84.5% of the participants (n = 
60) were native English speakers, and 15.5% (n = 11) of the participants were fluent in 
English, but used English as a second language. 
  Materials 
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 Twenty-four DRM lists were used in Experiment 2. Each list contained 10 associates. 
The recognition phase included 12 non-presented critical lures from 12 of the DRM lists, 48 
studied items (in which 12 were targeted items for belief manipulation), and 36 unrelated 
items. Twenty-four CRATs whose answers were 12 critical lures and 12 studied items 
(corresponding to the 24 DRM lists) were used. The GCS and DES questionnaires were 
administered to participants as well (see Experiment 1). 
 
  Design and Procedure 
A 2 (Time Interval: immediate vs. 1 week) × 2 (Memory Type: critical lures vs. studied 
items) × 2 (Belief: challenged vs. control) mixed design was used, where the first factor was 
between-subjects and the other two were within-subject factors. Thirty-six participants were 
randomly allocated to the immediate condition and 35 to the 1-week delay condition. 
Experiment 2 followed the same procedure as Experiment 1, except that 35 of the participants 
did not finish the problem-solving phase immediately after the challenging phase, but instead, 
did so one week later. Because the items in the challenged belief and control belief conditions 
were fixed, we switched the items in these two conditions for half of the participants in each 
Time Interval group. That is, belief for the same 12 target words was undermined in around 
half of the participants (n= 31), but belief for these words was not challenged in the other 
participants.  
Results and Discussion 
Recognition rates 
The mean recognition rate for unrelated items was 14.5%. For the targeted studied items 
and critical lures (i.e., those that served as the solutions to the subsequent 24 CRATs), the 
mean recognition rates in each condition are shown in Table 3. 
  Nonbelieved and believed memories 
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Memory and belief ratings for each word were recorded after the belief manipulation for 
that word. The same criteria for nonbelieved and believed memories used in Experiment 1 
were used here. Table 4 shows the mean percentages of critical lures and studied items that 
were nonbelieved and believed memories. 
  Solution rates of CRATs 
Again, we labelled the effect of successfully challenging or lowering participants’ beliefs 
as “undermining.” A 2 (Time Interval: immediate vs. 1 week) × 2 (Memory Type: critical 
lures vs. studied items) × 2 (Belief: undermining vs control) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted, with Time Interval as a between-subjects variable. Note that there were 14 
participants in total who did not form a nonbelieved true or a nonbelieved false memory. 
These participants’ CRAT data were not entered into the analysis. As a result, 34 participants 
were in the immediate condition and 23 were in the delay condition. There was no statistically 
significant three-way interaction effect for Time Interval × Memory Type × Belief, F(1, 55) = 
0.14, p = .71, and also no statistically significant two-way interactions. There was a main 
effect for Belief, F(1, 55) = 20.68, p < .001, partial η2 = .27, which, like Experiment 1, 
showed that undermining belief resulted in lower solution rates. There was no main effect for 
Memory Type, F(1, 55) = 1.37, p =.25, partial η2 = .02. Neither was there a main effect for 
Time Interval, F(1, 55) = 0.44, p =.51, partial η2 = .008.  
The above analysis is based on using the filtering criterion of nonbelieved memories 
having memory ratings that were at least two points higher than belief ratings. When we 
adopted the criterion of memory ratings being at least three points higher than belief ratings, a 
statistically significant main effect of Belief was detected as well, F(1, 55) = 44.10, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .45. As in Experiment 1, we performed an additional analysis by focusing on the 
items that participants recognized as “presented” in the recognition test. Even when only the 
recognition responses with “Yes (presented)” were included, a statistically significant main 
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effect of Belief was found, F(1, 67) = 18.70, p <.001, partial η2 = .21, showing that 
undermining belief led to less efficient problem-solving behavior. No main effect of Memory 
Type was found, F(1, 67) = 1.25, p =.26. There was no significant main effect of Time 
Interval, F(1, 67) = 0.003, p =.96 and no statistically significant interactions were detected.
 3
 
To rule out the possibility that the effect of belief was due to the difficulty of the CRATs, 
we changed the CRAT problems in the undermining belief and control conditions in around 
half (45.1%, n = 32) of the participants. We split the data into two groups in which 
participants received the opposite belief manipulation for the same materials. For instance, in 
one group, belief for “bread” was undermined and then participants solved a corresponding 
CRAT; in the other group, belief for “bread” was confirmed and participants solved the same 
CRAT. We conducted a 2 (Change: yes vs. no) × 2 (Memory Type: critical lures vs. studied 
items) ×2 (Belief: undermining vs. control) repeated measures ANOVA, with Change as a 
between-subject variable. No significant main effect of Change was found, F(1, 55) = 2.44, p 
=.12, indicating the materials did not impact our results. 
Solution times of CRATs 
We were also interested in whether undermining belief would impact CRAT solution 
times. For critical items, we conducted a 2 (Time Interval: immediate vs. 1-week delay) ×2 
(Belief: undermining vs. control) repeated measures ANOVA, with the first variable being 
between-subjects. Like Experiment 1, when participants solved no CRAT under the priming 
of (non)believed memories, no solution time data in that condition could be analyzed. There 
were 37 participants’ solution time data that could be used. There was no main effect of Belief, 
F(1, 36) = 0.45, p =.51, Time Interval, F(1, 36) = 0.28, p = .60, or interaction effect, F(1, 36) 
= 1.34, p =.25. For studied items, we conducted the same analysis. We found no main effects 
                                        
3 We examined whether being native English speaker or not would impact the results. When non-native 
English speakers were excluded, there were 29 participants in the immediate group and 17 participants in the 
delay group and the result pattern was not changed by the exclusion. 
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of Time Interval or Belief. Thus, CRAT solution times for false and true memories were not 
impacted by Belief and Time interval. 
  Exploratory Analysis 
We found no statistically significant correlation between compliance scores and number 
of nonbelieved memories (r (69) = .04, p = .73), which is consistent with Experiment 1. The 
data from both experiments suggest that compliance does not impact the formation of 
nonbelieved memories. Correlations between dissociative symptoms and number of true/false 
believed and nonbelieved memories were analyzed. We found no significant correlation 
between dissociative symptoms and true recognition rates (r (69) = -.21, p = 0.08), and also 
no significant correlation between dissociation and false recognition rate (r (69) = -.20, p 
= .09) emerged. No correlation was found between DES scores and overall number of 
nonbelieved memories (r (69) = .07, p = .59).  
Consistent with Experiment 1, we found that undermining belief in false memories led to 
fewer CRAT problems being solved than the control condition. Belief is conceptualized as the 
truth value of an event. Even though a CRAT is an insight-based problem-solving task, 
retracting belief in false memories impacts the ability of false memories to prime CRATs. The 
results on false memories from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 align with Bernstein et al.’s 
(2015) conclusion that false autobiographical beliefs, not memories, alter behavioral 
performance.  
What we also found was that undermining belief in true memories resulted in lower 
CRAT solution rates. In Experiment 1, we did not find this. The reason might be that we 
made several improvements in Experiment 2, such as including more CRATs in each 
condition, and assigning the CRATs to each condition in a more balanced way. In addition, in 
Experiment 2 we found no statistically significant results on CRAT solution times. The main 
reason for this might be that there was limited data on the solution times for CRATs. Only 
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when participants solved at least one CRAT problem could we obtain solution time data. This 
can be resolved in future studies by using easier CRAT problems. Also, our results showed 
that the deleterious effects of belief retraction on problem solving occurred both immediately 
and after one week. This shows that when belief is undermined, it does not have a short-lived 
effect, but it endures over time. This is line with research by Otgaar and colleagues (2013) 
who showed that nonbelieved memories can last for a month. 
 
General Discussion 
The current experiments serve as the first attempt to simultaneously assess the behavioral 
consequences of nonbelieved and believed memories on problem-solving behavior. We found 
evidence across two experiments that nonbelieved memories impacted problem-solving 
behavior under the conditions tested. The most intriguing finding was that undermining belief 
in false memories led to less efficient problem-solving behavior. This result persisted even 
after a 1-week delay. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental demonstration that for 
false memories, retracting belief adversely affects subsequent behavior.  
This novel finding implies that belief contributed more to the behavioral performance on 
the CRATs than recollection. This is in line with previous research suggesting belief in the 
occurrence of past events was more important in determining eating behavior than 
recollection (Bernstein et al., 2015). However, in this work, no experimental test was 
performed to manipulate belief separately and examine whether this would impact behavior. 
Our study is the first showing the consequences of belief and recollection on behavior by 
using a non-inferential, and perhaps more automatic, insight-based problem-solving task.  
Our findings have several theoretical implications. The data on nonbelieved memories 
support the distinction between belief and recollection. The distinction between belief and 
recollection was not made in the memory literature until recently (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2015; 
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Scoboria et al., 2004; Scoboria et al., 2014; Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). Previous studies 
mostly showed dissociation of belief and recollection for autobiographical events. For 
instance, research has shown that belief in actions (e.g., clapping hands) could be undermined 
while the recollected aspect of the actions remained intact (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 
2012; Mazzoni, Clark, & Nash, 2014). Also, experiments showed that belief in experiencing a 
hot balloon ride can be manipulated while recollection of the event remained intact (Otgaar et 
al., 2013). In our two experiments, we undermined belief for associatively-related words and 
recorded belief and memory ratings afterwards. We found that for both false and true 
memories, belief ratings dropped while memory/recollection ratings were high after 
undermining belief.  
Scoboria et al. (2014) proposed a theoretical model to explain the relationship between 
belief and memory (recollection). In this model, autobiographical belief and recollection are 
two independent continuous dimensions that result in different categories such as believed 
memories and nonbelieved memories. Our experiments support this view inasmuch as we 
successfully manipulated participants’ beliefs while recollections were retained. Based on the 
independence of these two components, it is proposed that belief in the occurrence of an event, 
rather than a specific memory for the event, is highly malleable and is the critical component 
in influencing behavior (Bernstein et al., 2015; Scoboria et al., 2014). Importantly, we found 
that for false memories, undermining belief led to a reduction in subsequent problem-solving 
behavior, a finding that accords well with the above proposition. As belief in occurrence is 
based in various inputs, just one of which is recollection, , theories that focus on episodic 
recollection alone may not be the best predictors of behavior. 
In Experiment 2, we found evidence that for true memory as well, problem-solving was 
more difficult when belief was undermined. This suggests that for memory in general, 
behavior is predominantly influenced by believing the event rather than recollecting the event. 
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It is unclear why we did not find this effect in Experiment 1. Although one might expect that 
challenging true memories is more difficult than false memories (e.g., Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, 
& Merckelbach, 2010), this is not what we found in the present experiments. Here, both 
nonbelieved true and false memories were evoked, something that might be related to the fact 
that the DRM procedure leads both to high levels of true and false recognition, with false 
recognition rates often not differing from true recognition rates (Roediger & McDermott, 
1995). Of course, future research should examine more closely whether belief is also 
important in guiding behavior for true memory. 
Associative-activation theory (AAT, Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; 
Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets, & Moritz, 2014), as well as the activation-monitoring theory 
(AMT, Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) provide explanations for the priming effects of 
false memories. AAT suggests that processing of one concept activates a corresponding node 
and this activation spreads automatically to nearby associative concept nodes. When DRM list 
items are presented and encoded, their activation spreads to non-presented, but related items 
(i.e., the critical lure) resulting in false memories. Because false memories are highly 
associated to true memories, they often exert similar priming effect on CRAT problems 
(Howe et al., 2013). In our experiments, we manipulated participants’ beliefs for the items 
after false and true memories were formed, and we found similar reduced priming effect for 
both true and false memories (Experiment 2). One possibility might be that undermining 
belief adversely affects spreading activation in one’s knowledge base thereby reducing its 
effects on subsequent tasks including the spreading activation required to solve CRATs. Of 
course, further investigation is needed to examine the precise mechanism by which belief and 
recollection can impact problem-solving behavior.  
One might argue that the manipulation of belief in our experiments might have changed 
the automatic nature of the priming process. In Experiment 2, the data showed that the CRAT 
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solution rates primed by true memories still remained high even after a one-week interval, but 
previous research has found that these rates dropped after a one-week delay (Howe et al., 
2013). Priming CRATs in prior research is considered to occur automatically by associative 
activation (Howe et al., 2010). Querying belief (e.g., undermining) in the current experiments 
may have made the recollections of true and false items more conscious and salient, which 
may have fundamentally changed the priming process. However, if we look at the data of the 
control condition in the immediate testing group, we found the exact same result with 
previous studies (solution rates: critical lures ≥ studied items > unrelated items), and in the 
immediate group, belief was also queried in the control condition. This suggests that our 
belief manipulation might not have affected the automatic nature of our priming effects.  
Our study also explored the relationship between compliance and nonbelieved memories. 
Both experiments demonstrated no statistical link between compliance scores and number of 
nonbelieved memories. Scoboria, Boucher, and Mazzoni (2015) found that the primary reason 
people retracted their belief in a memory was social feedback, such as someone telling you 
that your memory was not true. Our study found that people who were more compliant did not 
form more NBMs than people who were less compliant. One reason for this is that social 
feedback is more related to external pressure, such as suggestive information, whereas 
compliance can be regarded as an internal personality characteristic. Our null result begs the 
question whether the formation of NBMs might be more affected by external factors such as 
who provides social feedback (e.g., authority or stranger). 
One might object that our memory task is related to the problem-solving task and that 
this is a potential confound in our experiments. However, in food preference studies 
(Bernstein & Loftus, 2009), participants created false beliefs or memories towards a negative 
food experience in the first session, and then the amount of that food they ate was measured in 
the second session. Participants’ eating behavior was measured weeks or months after the first 
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session (e.g., Geraerts et al., et al., 2008; Scoboria et al., 2012). They were told that the 
second session was a completely irrelevant experiment as to reduce the chance that 
participants could link the two sessions with each other. Importantly, in the current 
experiments, we also told participants that our problem-solving task was an unrelated task. By 
way of confirmation that our manipulation succeeded, we interviewed some participants after 
the experiments and none of them could see the link between the memory task and the 
problem-solving task. 
To conclude, our experiments provide the first evidence that for false memories, 
problem-solving was hampered when belief was reduced. This shows that belief is the most 
active agent in impacting problem-solving behavior. Indeed, our experiments reveal novel 
evidence that belief and recollection have distinct behavioral consequences. The time has now 
come to extend this finding and investigate whether such differential consequences might also 
appear in other situations.   
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Appendix 
 
Examples of DRM lists and CRAT problems 
Critical 
Lures 
Black Bread  Car Needle Fruit Shirt 
 white 
dark 
charred 
night 
funeral 
colour 
grief 
death 
ink 
coal 
brown 
grey 
butter 
Food 
Eat 
sandwich 
Rye 
Jam 
Milk 
flour 
Jelly 
dough 
crust 
Slice 
truck 
bus 
automobile 
vehicle 
drive 
jeep 
Ford 
keys 
garage 
highway 
van 
taxi 
thread 
pin 
eye 
sewing 
sharp 
point 
prick 
thimble 
haystack 
thorn 
injection 
syringe 
apple 
vegetable 
orange 
kiwi 
citrus 
ripe 
pear 
banana 
berry 
cherry 
basket 
juice 
Blouse 
sleeves 
pants 
tie 
button 
shorts 
iron 
polo 
collar 
vest 
pocket 
jersey 
Associated 
CRAT Board/
mail/magic 
 
Crust/stale/ 
french 
Chase/police
/toy 
Knitting/pine/
work 
Salad/bowl/
juice 
Football/flanne
l/vest 
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Table 1. Recognition rates in different Memory Type and Belief conditions (M, 95%CI). 
 
Memory Type 
 
Critical lures Studied items Unrelated items 
Challenged 
belief 
0.68  
[0.57, 0.80] 
0.88 
[0.82, 0.93] 
0.10 
[0.06, 0.15] 
Control 
condition 
0.70 
[0.60, 0.80] 
0.85 
[0.77, 0.92] 
0.19 
[0.11, 0.27] 
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Table 2. Mean memory and belief ratings in each kind of induced memory (CI: confidence 
interval; n: number of participants contributing to the mean score; N: number of items 
contributing to the mean score). 
 
Memory Rating 
(95% CI) 
Belief Rating 
(95%CI) 
Memory-Belief 
Nonbelieved False Memory 5.02 
[4.61, 5.44] 
(n=27; N=76) 
1.42 
[1.12, 1.71] 
(n=27; N=76) 
3.60 
Nonbelieved True Memory 5.75 
[5.33, 6.17] 
(n=33; N=107) 
1.96 
[1.64, 2.28] 
(n=33; N=107) 
3.79 
No Belief No Memory 1.27 
[1.13, 1.40] 
(n=33; N=121) 
1.23 
[1.09, 1.38] 
(n=33; N=121) 
0.04 
Believed False Memory 6.46 
[5.97, 6.94] 
(n=34; N=124) 
7.25 
[6.92, 7.59] 
(n=34; N=124) 
-0.79 
Believed True Memory 7.09 
[6.81, 7.36] 
(n=34; N=122) 
7.59 
[7.41, 7.78] 
(n=34; N=122) 
-0.50 
Belief with No Memory 1.94 
[1.62, 2.26] 
(n=30; N=93) 
6.36 
[5.85, 6.86] 
(n=30; N=93) 
-4.42 
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Table 3. Mean recognition rates for critical lures and studied items in different conditions (N: 
number of recognized items). 
  Critical lures Studied items 
Immediate 
Challenged belief 69.0% (N = 149) 85.6% (N = 185) 
Control condition 68.5% (N = 148) 81.5% (N = 176) 
1-week delay 
Challenged belief 58.6% (N = 123) 81.4% (N = 171) 
Control condition 62.9% (N = 132) 76.2% (N = 160) 
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Table 4. Percentages of critical lures and studied items that were nonbelieved and believed 
memories in each condition. 
 
 
Critical lures Studied items 
Immediate 
Challenged belief 
(Nonbelieved memories) 
58.33% (N=126) 61.17% (N=132) 
Control condition  
(Believed memories) 
91.67% (N=198) 95.33% (N=206) 
1-week delay 
Challenged belief 
(Nonbelieved memories) 
45.23% (N=95) 48.09% (N=101) 
Control condition 
 (Believed memories) 
84.28% (N=177) 87.62% (N=184) 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Diagram of alignment between DRM items and CRAT problems. 
Figure 2. Mean solution rates in different Memory Type and Belief conditions (Experiment 1). 
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 3. Mean solution times in different Memory Type and Belief conditions (Experiment 
1). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 4a (left) and 4b (right). Figure 4a illustrates solution rates primed by different Memory 
Types and Belief conditions in the immediate group (Experiment 2). Figure 4b illustrates 
results in the 1-week delay group. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 2 
 
42 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4(a)  
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Figure 4(b) 
 
